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The Symbol and its Referent: An Issue for Library 
Education 
H. CURTIS WRIGHT 
The great need of the library profession today is to formulate a 
professional philosophy that will meet the rapidly changing needs of 
society for recorded knowledge. We must re-define our role in soci- 
ety ...[and] make of the library the agency it should be in the total 
communications process.. .. 
We must put our intellectual house in order or we will lose control 
of many functions relating to the communication of the written word 
that are properly our own....This need lies at the base of every other 
problem of librarianship ....1 am deeply disturbed by the malaise that 
has so long gripped our profession, its shallowness, its sterility, its 
intellectual immaturity, and I see-no remedy but to probe deeply, 
however great the pain.- Jesse Shera’ [emphasis added] 
Psychophysical Interactionism 
THEFUTURE OF LIBRARIANSHIP and library education is intimately 
bound up with the complex interrelationships of the physical symbol 
and its symbolic referent. But the physical symbol is always a sensible 
datum functioning as the means of communication to or from the 
intellect; thus, i t  belongs to a different order of being than the symbolic 
referent, which always constitutes an ideative reality. This has definite 
implications. It means, first of all, that the relationship of symbol to 
referent is inherently dualistic and psychophysical, because human 
communication cannot occur unless physical realities (ta physika, 
which exist as atomic bodies in motion) are used as symbols and wired 
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up to formal realities ( tapsychika,which subsist as ideas in the mind). It 
means, secondly, that the psychophysical existents and subsistents 
which constitute the symbols and referents of human communication 
must be capable of interaction: they cannot be creatures from com- 
pletely different orders of reality which constitute parallel universes that 
are something alike but mutually exclusive and forever incapable of 
influencing one another. The separate worlds of form and matter do 
come together in man; and it  is in man, if anywhere, that the problems 
of human communication must be resolved. Finally-and most 
importantly-it means that librarianship, which is intimately involved 
with the communication of knowledge, is thereby deeply involved with 
the mind-body problem of philosophy, since (1)knowledge is composed 
of formal subsistents in the world of mind, whereas (2)all expressions of 
knowledge consist of physical existents in the world of atoms in motion. 
The mind-body problem implies, furthermore, that the librarians and 
their educators have identical requirements and similar functions, both 
must be able to discern the system implicit in librarianship, the latter in 
order to explain it and the former in order to implement it; but neither 
can do either unless the interordinal relationship of physical symbols 
and ideative referents is understood. This relationship constitutes the 
major philosophical issue of the library profession in the twentieth 
century. Library education, surely, must ultimately rest on a sound 
philosophy of librarianship. That philosophy clearly must be dualistic, 
psychophysical, and interactive. Since all of the elements for construct- 
ing such a philosophy are available in the writings of form-
philosophers like Abraham Kaplan, George Herbert Mead, and Karl 
Popper, this paper presents the dualistic philosophy of psychophysical 
interactionism as something for library education to consider-but not 
as something for immediate implementation in its curricula. 
The Two Worlds of Philosophy and the Mind-Body Problem 
All philosophies struggle to understand the meaning of the differ- 
ences between (1) the physical world man lives in, and (2)the formal 
world of the spirit that lives in man. The world man lives in constitutes 
the temporal mode of objective becoming, the natural order of the 
material universe whose physical existents include everything that 
exists in a physical way. The formal order of the noetic universe, on the 
other hand, is the permanent mode of subjective being, the world within 
man whose metaphysical subsistents and their derivatives lie com- 
pletely beyond the material universe and include everything that exists 
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in a nonphysical way. These differences, which are implicit in Greek 
thought from the very earliest times, became fully explicit in Plato and 
have persisted throughout the Western intellectual tradition. 
Greek philosophy is based on one metaphysical assumption, two 
philosophical systems, and three basic questions. The first philo- 
sophers of science were the Ionian materialists, monists who avoided the 
dualism of mind-body metaphysics by assuming the perfect unity of life 
and matter. Thus, they accepted the monistic version of hylozoism, the 
belief that matter was alive; and they tried to answer the most basic 
cosmological question implied by that belief, the question of ultimate 
substance: “What is the living physis made out of?” 
In Southern Italy, however, the second wave of matter-
philosophers developed leanings toward a twofold reality. The Pythag- 
oreans of Croton, whose problem was also to understand the material 
physis, created a scientific formalism based on a definity-indefinity 
dualism derived from number mysticism: they argued that (1)all exis- 
tents are defined space or time, because space-time, though undefined, is 
infinitely definable as physical objects (space materialized) or physical 
processes (time materializing); (2)the elements of objective reality are 
mathematically determined, since definity is quantifiable and numbers 
constitute the defined forms, primary patterns, or mathematical models 
of observables; and (3) observables are material realizations of their 
forms. Philosophers at Elea discovered the dualism implicit in hylozo- 
ism, which suggested that matter (hylos)was somehow different than 
life (zoe),or at least different from the noetic structure (logos)underly-
ing the sensory patternment of change. Matter, they argued, could not 
be both a constant (because it was always there, forever like itself) and a 
variant (because it was alive-and therefore embroiled in ceaseless 
change). This discovery shattered the monistic unity of Ionian material- 
ism and split Italian materialism into opposing camps of extreme 
monists, who polarized over the postulates of permanence (stasis)and 
impermanence (Itinesis)and joined battle over the second cosmological 
question of scientific matter-philosophy, the question of motion: “Do 
things exist in a permanent state of Being, or in a temporal process of 
Becoming?” Parmenides and the Eleatics took the extreme rationalist 
position: they were skeptics as to sense data, who, by accepting the 
postulate of permanence completely (and completely rejecting the pos-
tulate of impermanence), became so “addicted” to Being that change 
could not exist at all and everything but permanence (stasis)was unreal. 
Heraclitus, the mirror obverse of Parmenides and a wet blanket if there 
ever was one, took the extreme sensualist position: he was wholly 
committed to Becoming, a total skeptic as to intellection, who reversed 
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Eleatic procedure (by accepting impermanence completely and reject- 
ing permanence the same way), formulated his infamous doctrine of the 
flux (panta rei: all things flow, motion is all there is, everything but 
change is an illusion, and so on), and concluded that impermanence 
ruled the cosmos because process (kinesis)was the only reality. 
The result was an either-or controversy of extreme monistic views 
(in which everything stood perfectly still or moved frantically about), a 
standoff of permanence u. impermanence that opened an unbridgable 
gulf between the Parmenidean philosophy of Being and the Heraclitan 
philosophy of Becoming. This controversy was seen as ridiculous by the 
common man; but i t  became a challenge to the new breed of “reconcil- 
ers” in philosophy, the Aegean followers of Leucippus and Democritus, 
who succeeded marvelously well in bridging the unbridgable gulf 
between Parmenides and Heraclitus by combining the ideas of Being 
and Becoming in the atomic model of matter. The atornoi were physical 
permanents moving freely in space: they were qualitatively alike, 
because they were always the same; but their patterned combinations 
were never the same, because they were quantitatively distinct. Atoms, 
that is to say, varied only in their arrangements; and this enabled the 
matter-philosophers to account for everything that is-at least in the 
materialistic view of reality. 
The significance of pre-Socratic materialism for the history of 
Western philosophy is difficult to overestimate. It rescued the Greeks 
from their fascination with Oriental mysticism by directing their inter- 
ests to the cosmos and opening the way for the spiritual life of Greece to 
become intellectual, scientific, and cultural (rather than mystic and 
theological). It is the source, moreover, of the most fundamental contri- 
butions ever made to Western science. These include (1 )  making logical 
and ontological distinctions between order (in the intelligible world of 
mind) and disorder (in the sensible world of matter), and (2)reasoning 
from observed disorder in the physis to an ordering principle in the 
rnetaphysis. These two contributions are virtually sufficient to account 
for the modern scientific belief that natural phenomena can be 
explained by natural law: the matter-philosophers of Archaic Greece 
believed that the physical variants of Becoming were incomprehensible 
unless they were secured to the rational constants of Being; and we 
therefore believe that there is order in a phenomenal world governed by 
law. That is their most basic cosmological legacy to Western 
civilization-the powerful materialistic faith that natural law is real, 
that it does explain phenomena, and that it can be understood. 
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The world known to science was thus constructed as a mechanics of 
swirling atoms before philosophy was confronted by Athenian immate- 
rialism, which constructed another model of a verydifferent world. The 
third question of Greek philosophy, therefore, was the humanistic 
question posed by Socrates: “What is man?” Socrates marks an impor- 
tant turning point in the history of philosophy, for he was the foremost 
exponent of the “anthropocentric attitude to life,” which “pervades 
everything felt, made, or thought by the Greeks.”’ He was not enamored 
with the physical world, to say the least: he was deeply interested, 
however, in the world within man; and that interest emerged from him 
as the potent philosophical tendency of humanism, which derailed 
scientific materialism at Athens and focused the attention of philos- 
ophers on “the study of man himself ..., his nature and place in the 
world, his relations with his fellow^."^ He urged the Athenians to care 
for their souls because the soul was the man, whereas the body only 
belonged to the man: the human body was the physical technology of 
the soul, something the man found necessary and useful for interacting 
with the world around him; but it was not the man, because man was a 
formal thinking subject-not an objective mechanics of a ~ t i o n . ~He 
personified the gnothi seauton, a proverbial Greek maxim meaning 
“know thyself,” which he also urged upon the Athenians: if you want to 
understand the human Geistesleben, he argued, you must begin with an 
introspective examination of the formal patterns in your own intellec- 
tual and spiritual life (towhich alone you have personal and immediate 
access), learn to recognize the presence of similar forms in the expres- 
sions of other people, and end with the subjective ability to understand 
the formal meanings of human expression both generally and in the 
arts, literature, and philosophy. This recognitive approach to the study 
of immaterial form was the furthest thing imaginable from the analyti- 
cal study of physical substance and content (which dissolved everything 
into atoms), because the subjective recognition of form and its intersub- 
jective communication cannot be equated with the objective analysis 
and description of matter and energy. Thus Socrates constructed 
another world for philosophy-the new world of the human spirit- 
and opposed i t  to the physical world. The very different ways of think-
ing about these two worlds were then systematized in the 
form-philosophy of Plato and the matter-philosophy of Democritus 
and worked into a comprehensive philosophical synthesis by Aristotle, 
who gathered together all the threads of Greek philosophy clear back to 
Thales. Between them, Democritus and Plato constitute an ontological 
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dualism of scientific and humanistic outlooks which has dichotomized 
the entire history of philosophy, because “this division of philosophers 
into materialists and teleologists-matter-philosophers and form- 
philosophers-is perhaps the most fundamental that can be made in 
any age, our own i n c l ~ d e d . ” ~  
The resolute persistence of these two worlds, once constructed in 
antiquity, has been astonishing. Nothing in Western thought has 
escaped their influence, for the Greek disjunction of reason and the 
senses which supports it, though shot u p  often enough, has never been 
shot down. It has been observed, for example, by William James- 
whose natural realism and anti-intellectual pragmatism identify him 
with matter-philosophy-that philosophers tend to be “sentimental” 
humanists (like his enemies) or “hard-hearted” scientists (like himself). 
This is his “celebrated dichotomy” of philosophical temperaments, 
“the tender-minded being Rationalistic (going by ‘principles’),” the 
tough-minded “being Empiricist (going by ‘facts’).” James was refer- 
ring to the defensive religionists and arrogant scientists of his own day, 
to be sure. But “even so,” says Ayer, “he does succeed in characterizing 
two broadly opposing tendencies which can be distinguised throughout 
the history of phi lo~ophy.”~ This grouping, or something like it, is 
ultimately inevitable, because to thisday philosophy has only two main 
problems, of which all its other problems are subsets: the nature of the 
physical world, which includes all of the phenomenal objects of scien- 
tific inquiry, and the spiritual nature of m a n ,  which constitutes the 
noumenal basis of humanistic study.’ This fundamental dichotomy has 
permanently polarized philosophers over the irreconcilable contradic- 
tions of physical monism and psychophysical dualism in the West. 
Zeller has explained how this happened when the monistic assumption 
of unity in Greek philosophy was confronted by the dualism of its major 
systems. 
Greek philosophy shows us the formative conditions of critical 
thought, in which an obstinate distinction between its two elements 
and their disruptive separation develop from the supposed serenity of 
their unified existence and original equipoise without realizing their 
latent promise of unity ....The original premise of Greek philosophy, 
the starting point from which itproceeds, is the harmonious relation- 
ship of mind with nature which is the distinguishing characteristic of 
classical culture generally; and it is only step by step, and virtually 
against her will, that philosophy sees a most basic distinction forced 
upon her ....Thus, the ultimate result of Greek philosophy is a dual- 
ism, which, for all of her critical efforts to resist it, she can no longer 
overcome; and the development of this dualism can be fully docu- 
mented, even in the days of her greatest efflorescence. 
LIBRARY TRENDS 734 
The  Symbol and Its Referent 
Nevertheless,...since the original presupposition of [unity in] 
Greek thought is progressively validated by the distinctive features 
which determine its character, the inability of Greek philosophy to 
reconcile its contradictions satisfactorily must also be explained by 
that selfsame presupposition, from which it never frees itself: the 
unity of mind and nature, which it requires and presupposes, is 
clearly the unbroken unity of the classical world view; and when this 
view of reality breaks down, there remains to philosophy no means of 
closing the gap which, from its own point of view, has no right to be 
there in the first place.’ 
The mind-body problem, which is derived from the explicit dual- 
ism of Plato’s form-philosophy and Democritean matter-philosophy, is 
without question the most persistent problem of Western thought, 
because the rational communication of intellectual order, structure, and 
form is logically distinct and ontologically separate from the empirical 
description of physical objects, processes, and forces. One might think, 
therefore, that 2600 years of failure to bridge the gap between formalism 
and materialism might justify the inference that it cannot be bridged; 
but that is precisely the inference one cannot make in the West, because 
it  demolishes the foundation on which philosophy was built-its 
monistic presumptions of unity between form and matter. This pre- 
sumption is based, as Zeller indicates, on the “unwritten philosophy” of 
classical antiquity, the unverifiable postulate of ultimate rationality 
which assumes that man and the universe are somehow alike, that the 
universe is indeed orderly and intelligible, and that the human mind is 
capable of constructinga complete system of truth.” That is the magnif- 
icent pipe dream of ancient Greece: it is hopelessly idealistic and unreal- 
izable; but the Greeks really beileved in the possibility of creating one 
superscience for explaining everything; and the modern monists have 
followed them in trying to construct a scientific system so comprehen-
sive and so airtight that, starting from any particular in the system, i t  
could induce an all-inclusive premise from which the whole of reality 
could be deduced. This ambitious vision of reality, however, remains 
patently absurd (as i t  was anciently), for i t  still requires its seers to 
assume one of the two extreme monist positions first taken in antiquity: 
everything must be ultimately reducible to intellectual patterns, as in 
the form-monism of Parmenides, or to physical motions, as in the 
matter-monism of Heraclitus. Either of those positions, of course, 
annihilates the mind-body problem, which becomes a nonproblem if 
there is no such thing as mind and everything is matter or vice versa; but 
every other philosophical position faces the realities of mind and matter 
and wrestles with the problem of determining, if possible, how they 
relate to one another. 
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The modern philosophers, even though scientifically minded and 
monistically inclined, have not been able to avoid the mind-body prob- 
lem. They learned, as their predecessors had already discovered, that the 
world of matter and energy is a temporal domain of physical Becoming 
perceived by the senses, whereas the world of form is an eternal realm of 
permanent Being whose patterned abstractions are discerned solely by 
thought. Each of these worlds has attracted adherents since the begin- 
ning of time, as described by Bertrand Russell. 
The world of [formal] being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful 
to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical sys- 
tems....The world of [physical] existence is fleeting, vague, without 
sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement....Accord-
ing to our temperaments, we shall prefer ...the one or the other. The 
one we do not prefer will probably seem to us a pale shadow of the one 
we prefer ....But the truth is that both have the same claim on our 
impartial attention, both are real and both are important.” 
But how are these worlds related? That question has thus far defied 
adequate solution, although partial answers have been provided by the 
modern philosophers. Impatient with the metaphysical theories of their 
predecessors, they abandoned traditional philosophy and joined, 
almost to a man, in a massive effort to find a valid method for obtaining 
reliable information, regardless of the world it came from, because they 
were determined to get at the truth. “They were successful in the search 
for a sound method”; but once discovered, “it became the method of 
sczence,”12 not a universal method for disclosing the truth about 
every thing. 
The difficulty was that philosophers continued to disagree on every- 
thing except the method of science....To possess a method is to have a 
way of deciding what questions may sensibly he raised, and how to 
progress toward definite answers. Scientists obviously have such a 
way [of deciding scientific questions] ....As a result of the concentra- 
tion on method, a few principles of sound inductive inquiry became 
firmly established; [and] from that time on they have commanded 
respect from every seeker for truth in the realm of observable fact.13 
Thus, the methods of science have become effective and appropriate for 
obtaining information about the physical world of bodies in motion, 
which constitutes the subject matter of science. But all other aspects of 
the mind-body problem remain unresolved. The trouble is that modern 
science, far from realizingits self-defeating ambition to include all truth 
and encompass all reality, suffers (as science has always suffered) from 
“an intrinsic, built-in limitation upon the growth of scientific 
understanding”-an epistemological limitation of human logic that 
LIBRARY TRENDS 736 
The Symbol and Its Referent 
rests on a metaphysical “Law of [the] Conservation of Inf~rmation,”’~ 
which corresponds to the physical laws of the conservation of matter 
and energy. This law has been stated by Medawar as follows: “No 
process of logical reasoning-no mere act of mind or computer- 
programmable operation-can enlarge the information con tent of the 
axioms and premises or observation statements from which i t  pro-
ceed~.”’~This law, which determines the limits of scientific knowledge, 
governs such things as (1) mathematical theorems, which “are merely a 
spelling out, a bringing into the open, of information already contained 
in the axioms and postulates”; ( 2 )  deductive conclusions, because 
deduction “merely makes explicit information that is already there” 
and “is not a procedure by which new information can be brought into 
being”; and (3) inductive generalizations, since no generalization “can 
contain more information than the sum of its known instances.”16 
“Thus Law of [the] Conservation of Information makes i t  clear that 
from observation statements or descriptive laws having only empirical 
furniture there is no process of reasoning by which we may derive 
theorems having to do with first and last things.”” To summarize the 
whole matter, that is to say, the scientist, specifically qua scientist, can 
say absolutely nothing-whether positive, neutral, or negative-about 
the metaphysical problems of philosophy or theology because “the 
propositions and observation statements of science have empirical fur- 
niture only.”” If the implications of this law had been understood and 
respected, the methodological imperalism of modern thought could 
never have developed, for the physical methods of science would not 
have been transferred, in strict simian fashion, from physics, to chemis-
try, to biology, to physiology, topsychology, tosociology, and thence to 
the rest of the social sciences and even to the humanities; and mathemat- 
ics, the intellectual technology of materialism, would not be applied to 
everything today.lg It has taken a long time, but the modern philoso- 
phers have finally come to realize that “knowledge is not the simple 
affair it had previously been taken tobe,” and that they must distinguish 
“between truth as confirmable by scientific techniques and truth that 
can only be won in other ways.”2o Considerations like these have tre- 
mendous implications for the scientizing of librarianship and its reper- 
cussions in library education. 
Librarianship and the Two Worlds of Philosophy 
From chaos to  Kaplan.21 The library profession, according to 
Shera, should adopt the philosophy of library education expressed in 
Abraham Kaplan’s “The Age of the That philosophy, how- 
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ever, implies three things about librarians and their educators: (1) they 
have never isolated, much less resolved, the fundamental problem of 
librarianship; (2)they have forsaken the humanistic foundations of 
their profession in the name of science; and (3)they do not understand 
the occupational alignment of librarianship with the metasciences. 
Correcting these deficiences is the key tocleaning up  the mess librarian- 
ship is in; and its only alternative is learning how best to live with the 
mess. 
The fundamental problem of librarianship is the unprecedented 
and ever-deepening involvement of the modern age with symbolism. 
Symbols clearly “occupy a larger part in our lives today than ever 
before”; and “the size of that part,” as Kaplan indicates, “is growing 
e ~ p o n e n t i a l l y ” ~ ~because the knowledge explosion, which has trans- 
formed the modern era into an age of the symbol, is overwhelming 
everybody with its veritable oceans of information. “Theories about 
information,” by which Kaplan specifically means “theories about 
symbol proce~ses ,”~~ constitute one of the basic cultural realities of the 
twentieth century, which has become increasingly immersed in this 
whole problem of symbolism and is currently struggling to stay afloat 
in it. According to Kaplan, therefore, i t  is the symbolic nature of our 
cultural environment which explains why “enormous changes at every 
level of modern society can be associated with the concept of informa-
tion [emphasis in ~ r i g i n a l ] . ” ~  The growth of symbolism has caused, 
first of all, “the sheer volume of information,” which makes it virtually 
impossible for anyone to keep abreast of developments in any field; it 
has also caused the “fantastic growth in the technology by [means of] 
which information is produced, processed, and transmitted” in the 
physical world; and it has created the “many intellectual disciplines” 
which have recently “come into being around processes of symboliza-
tion or have begun to focus...[on] the nature of language and symbo- 
lism. ’I2‘ Thus, the information problem and its technologies are merely 
the expressions of a deep-seated cultural anxiety caused by the unruly 
growth of knowledge in a symbolic environment that seems completely 
out of control. “From the standpoint of the theory of ideas,” which is 
Kaplan’s standpoint throughout, everythin suggests that “ours is the 
age of the symbol [emphasis in original].”’ He concludes that, given 
the context of relentless cultural change, it is “altogether understand- 
able” that librarianship, which is “occupied centrally with precisely 
what underlies all these changes,” should be “engaged in a search for 
some fixities in this flux, and concerned with re-examining the means- 
...for the achievement of its purposes”; and headds that “the problem of 
the profession is indeed a genuine problem and is a piece with a com- 
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parable roblem...faced by many other professions ...[and by] societyas a 
E3whole.” 
Comment is necessary at this point, lest Kaplan’s remarks be inter- 
preted without reference to the mind-body problem or the two worlds of 
philosophy. He distinguishes sharply, for example, between (1) the 
formal abstractions of information, or the ideas that exist outside of the 
individual consciousness in an objective but nonphysical way as the 
intellectual products of countless human minds, and (2) the physical 
manifestations of information,or the symbolic data by means of which 
ideas are expressed and communicated in the physical world. When 
Kaplan discusses “the sheer volume of information,” therefore, he is 
talking about ideas. When he speaks of “the technology by which 
informa tion is produced, processed, and transmitted,” however, he is 
discussing the means by which symbolic data, or the physical manifesta-
tions of ideas, are produced in the social order and used by human 
beings as instruments of communication. This ontological difference 
between the metaphysical nature of ideas (ta psychika) and their physi- 
cal manifestations (ta physika) is absolutely essential to understanding 
Kaplan’s thought; and that raises important informational questions 
about the psychophysical nature of the human involvement with sym- 
bolism. Does information reduce to something physical in the empiri- 
cal world of matter and energy as in science? Or does i t  reduce to 
metaphysical patterns in the intellectual spirit world of ideas as in 
philosophy? Is information the machinery of communication? Or is i t  
distinct from the communicative machinery? Our answer to these ques- 
tions will disclose the presuppositions that dominate our thinking 
about information. If we think information is physical data (such as 
visual characters or speech sounds), we consign i t  to matter-philosophy; 
and that consigns us to the scientific study of information conceived as 
nonsymbolic realities in the physical environment. If we think of infor- 
mation as ideas, on the other hand, i t  belongs to form-philosophy; and 
that commits us to the humanistic study of information conceived as 
symbolic realities in the cultural environment. 
These two assumptions and the studies they imply are not antithet- 
ical. They are very different, however, because science analyzes the 
physical behavior of symbols, whereas humanism recognizes the formal 
meanings of symbolic referents. Scientific theories of the physical sym- 
bol are paralleled today by humanistic theories of the symbolic referent. 
But the progressive librarians, who invariably think of themselves as 
“scientific,” have always preferred the former to the latter; and that 
underscores Kaplan’s point: what is needed is a truly comprehensive 
theory of communication that integrates the realities at both ends of a 
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wire connecting human beings to their physical and cultural 
environments-a psychophysical theory that explains all of their com- 
plex interactions with both of those environments. And finally, 
Kaplan’s remark about “intellectual disciplines,” which explore the 
symbolic environment, cannot be understood without reference to 
“empirical discipline^,"^^ which investigate the physical environmknt. 
“Empirical” means “observational”-an important point, since the 
empirical disciplines always produce knowledge of empirical realities 
that can be obserued, no matter how theoretical such knowledge may 
become, whereas the intellectual disciplines can only create knowledge 
of intellectual realities that cannot be observed, although they can be 
thought and communicated as thought. This important distinction 
between two orders of knowledge has been overlooked by the informa- 
tion professionals. They have confused first-order knowledge about 
empirical phenomena, or the intellectual knowledge of physical reali- 
ties required by science, with second-order knowledge about knowl- 
edge, or the knowledge of intellectual realities required by librarians. 
That clearly reveals the nonscientific character of librarianship: it is not 
concerned with realities; it is concerned with knowledge, which always 
consists of human subjective reports about realities. “Human knowl- 
edge,” as Kaplan reminds us, “is something which is k n o w n  to very, 
very few human beings,”30 although it is used by everybody [emphasis 
added]. 
Humanism, according to Kaplan, provides the basic foundation of 
librarianship. It has also given birth to symbolism, which not only 
creates the central problem of librarianship but sounds “the keynote of 
all humanistic problems,” whose function is to clarify subjective ques- 
tions “instead of obscuring them as traditional scientific methods have 
done.”31 The human use of symbols during the Golden Age, asa matter 
of fact, was responsible for introducing the new outlook of form-
philosophy into the Western intellect-an outlook derived from 
humane concern for the symbolic forms of Athenian immaterialism, 
not from scientific interest in the cosmos. Western thought began as 
matter-philosophy in Ionia and continued as matter-philosophy in 
southern Italy and the Aegean. At Athens, however, it boarded a teeter- 
totter balanced on the shoulders of Socrates, where i t  has teetered and 
tottered ever since. Before Socrates, all philosophers were materialists; 
with Socrates, however, the materialists were confronted by the genius 
of a superb form-philosopher; and after Socrates, i t  has been two for the 
seesaw all the way.32 The formalists initially dominated the teeter-totter 
and controlled its use for over 2000 years. The materialists overpowered 
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the formalists in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century A.D., 
however, and have since controlled the business end of the teeter-totter. 
The tremendous success of this scientific revolution in thought has 
made things difficult for humanism in the Western civilizations, where 
materialistic ways of thinking have invaded all aspects of modern life. 
There are signs of modern discontent with materialism, however, as 
Socrates has made it forever impossible for the people of any Western 
culture to maintain an exclusive scientific interest in the outside world, 
without wondering about the world within. This discontent is inevita- 
ble, necessary, and desirable in librarianship, which is an intellectual 
discipline based on rational form, because one cannot fight realities: 
one can only find out what one’s realities are and go along with them. 
Kaplan argues that librarianship and library education must eventually 
come to grips with the form-philosophy of critical humanism. “The 
humanistic basis is there, and [it] will and must remain as a basis.”33 
That explains the knowledge orientation of librarians: their need to 
know about the actual uses human beings make ofinformation “must 
always remain f ~ n d a m e n t a l ” ~ ~  to librarianship because it is fundamen- 
tal to humanism itself. That needcannot be met by scientific knowledge 
about external nature. It calls for knowledge of human nature, and that, 
says Kaplan, “is nothing other than knowledge of people,” or more 
specifically, knowledge “of the various ways in which ...[people] gener- 
ate and transmit and interpret ideas or i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ” ~ ~  These remarks 
carry two important implications. They imply, first of all, that librar- 
ians require an instrumental knowledge of behavior as the human 
means of dealing with information; but they do not require scientific 
knowledge of human behavior per se. And secondly, Kaplan is clearly 
not talking about information-as-data in the form of graphemes (visible 
squiggles on paper), phonemes (audible wrinkles in the atmosphere), or 
electrochemical impulses (the circuitry of our nervous systems and 
computers); he is thinking of information-as-ideas and struggling to 
understand (1) how human beings bring ideas into existence, (2)how 
human beings communicate the ideas they bring into existence, and 
(3)how human beings interpret the ideas they bring into existence and 
communicate. 
From this repeated emphasis on information-as-ideas, Kaplan con- 
cludes that students of librarianship should be grounded in knowledge 
about knowledge by getting to know ideas. He therefore supposes that, 
“sometime in the course of training,” the student will have studied 
(1) the sociology ofknowledge, (2) the history of ideas, and (3)the struc- 
ture of inquiry, “not merely in some area ...of special interest to him but 
in broad historical and cultural terms.”36 And he further supposes that 
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library education not only contains humanistic “beliefs about what 
men are like ...and how they make use of ideas” but also inculcates such 
humanistic values as the love of learning, the love of ideas, the love of 
truth, “and even ...the love of books.”37 But Kaplan is overly optimistic 
here, and it must be noted that the library educators have seldom 
included intellectual studies of this sort in their curricula. Most of them 
have not been interested in Karl Mannheim, for example, who created 
the sociology of knowledge in order to study the impact of social 
organization on ideas; nor have they ever taken seriously the social 
epistemology proposed by Jesse Shera (the mirror image of Mannheim), 
who urged the library profession to study the impact of ideas on social 
organization. 38 Philosophy and intellectual history, furthermore, have 
never been compatible with the ultrapragmatic interests of librarians 
and their educators, who have always managed to avoid the history of 
ideas as though i t  were the plague. And the continuing addiction of 
library educators to the scientific models of “research” is tragically 
interesting: they see no difference betwen the intellectual structure of 
inquiry and the operational procedures of research because their inter- 
ests are overwhelmingly utilitarian; and they have therefore opted for 
the researcher’s view of critical inquiry by training their students to 
concentrate on the functions and outcomes of research. But Kaplan’s 
emphasis on “the structure of inquiry” is slanted toward the observer’s 
view of research precisely because librarians are not researchers: they are 
the philosophers of research whose function is to attend the research 
interests of other people. They cannot do  that properly, however, unless 
they know which of the many intellectual strategies of research are and 
are not compatible with the specific research interests of their patrons. 
Thus, Kaplan’s emphasis is squarely on the thinking that underlies all 
forms of research, not on the operational procedures and functional 
apparatus that grind the specific content of “scientific” research into 
practical results and conclusions. The intellectual loves of ideas, learn- 
ing, and truth, moreover, are indeed appropriate values for librarians. 
But, says Shera, “Kaplan weakens this admirable list by adding ...‘the 
love of books.’ ””Shera’s point is that librarians should think in terms 
of their intellectual functions, not in terms of their communicative 
tooling: when they swoon with ecstasy over a monograph they are like 
emotional mechanics who go into raptures at the sight of ratchets and 
wrenches. The library profession, finally, has not followed Kaplan’s 
humanistic recommendations. It has followed the advice of information 
science, which stems from an empirical commitment to the modern 
version of ancient matter-philosophy. The result has been the scientiz- 
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ing of a humanisticidea-business that cannot be scientized; and the only 
possible remedy for this condition is to return librarianship to its 
humanistic foundation. 
Kaplan has consistently argued that librarianship is an intellectual 
discipline based on the philosophical study of ideas, not an empirical 
discipline basedon the scientific study of facts. Its foundation, therefore, 
is intellectual as in the humanities, not observational as in the sciences. 
“This intellectual foundation,” he now says, “can be provided by 
nothing other than the ...metascien~es,”~~specifically because the meta- 
sciences are disciplines that study the intellectual structure of 
knowledge-not disciplines that use knowledge to study something 
else. This argument means that librarianship cannot line up  and salute 
with the analytical disciplines which study scientific phainomena 
(sensibles that cannot be thought) because it  owes allegiance to the 
recognitive disciplines which study humanistic noumena (thinkables 
that cannot be sensed). When Kaplan refers to “the mathematical sci- 
ences as a basis for library e d ~ c a t i o n , ” ~ ~  therefore, he is not saying that 
librarianship is some sort of geometry or algebra: he is saying that the 
students of librarianship have much in common with the students of 
mathematical and verbal logic (who study formal relationships) and 
little in common with the students of physics and chemistry (who study 
physical objects and processes, and magnetic, electrical, and nuclear 
forces). Lest we misinterpret Kaplan on this point, however, we should 
read very carefully the following important statement about the 
metasciences. 
These are sciences not about subject matters provided by man and 
nature, but about subject matters provided fundamentally by our 
ideas about man and nature, or by our language, or by our ways of 
transmitting and processing ...information ....I mean disciplines like 
mathematics, logic, linguistics, semantics, and, in the narrower sense, 
theory of information, and maybe cybernetics [emphasis added].42 
Editorial emphasis on the third occurrence of the word “about” in this 
statement has misled everybody as to its meaning. But this emphasis is 
better placed if the italics are transferred to “ideas,” since Kaplan’s 
whole point is that the metasciences are form-oriented disciplines that 
study human thought, not matter-oriented disciplines that study the 
objects of sensation. No one can distinguish between (1) “sci-
ences...about subject matters provided by man and nature” and (2)sci-
ences “about subject matters ...about man and nature,” because the 
former is ultimately the same thing as the latter. Thus, the contrast he 
makes is the classical distinction of Western philosophy, the fundamen- 
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tal distinction between (1) physical “subject matters provided by man 
and nature” and (2) formal “subject matters provided by our ideas about 
man and nature”-or about anything else. That is a distinction we can 
live with and must accept, or the whole concept of the metasciences 
becomes meaningless. 
The metasciences, which study thinkables, include many disci- 
plines that are closely related to science. But these disciplines, according 
to Kaplan, “then range off into other related metas~iences”~~ which, if 
extended far enough, would ultimately include the studies of linguistics 
and semantics and the subject matters of art, literature, philosophy, and 
history. It is important to understand this broadening of the metasci- 
ences, which originally included only the formal disciplines of science. 
The term rnetascience,was originally coined “as a name for the study of 
scientific inference” by John 0. Wisdom in order to make a clear 
distinction between science and the philosophy of science.44 The study 
of scientific procedure, according to Wisdom, is really two studies: 
(1) the study of scientific practice, which includes methodology or the 
study of scientific methods; and (2) the study of scientific inference, or 
metascience as the philosophical study of scientific propositions.45 The 
philosophical study of scientific knowledge, in other words, must be 
carefully distinguished from the scientific study of phenomena. This 
distinction is basic because “knowing about knowledge,” which 
includes knowing about scientific knowledge, “is not the regular busi- 
ness of scientist^,"^^ although it is precisely the business of specialists in 
the psychology, sociology, history, philosophy, or librarianship of 
science. Metascience, that is to say, “is concerned with the logical, 
epistemological, and ontological aspects of science, ...not with the indi- 
vidual or social behavior of scientists” or with phenomena: i t  does not 
add, therefore, to our knowledge of the world; but it does inform the 
intellectual faculties of abstract understanding and practical judgment 
by ordering (and thus by deepening) the knowledge we already have.47 
Thus, the phenomena observed by scientists belong to the factual order 
of science, which they study by observational methods; but the formal 
order of science, which can only be studied through the utterances 
communicated by scientists, includes all of the thinking scientists do 
about the phenomena they observe, and all of the information they 
communicate about observed phenomena-whether they communicate 
it orally, by writing, or otherwise. This means that the formal order of 
scientific inference, which was originally the sole concern of meta- 
science, is distinct and separate from the factual order of science. Does i t  
also mean that scientific inference is a microcosm, a model of the larger 
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concern for human inference generally? It does indeed. Kaplan’s exten- 
sion of the metasciences to include all of the formal disciplines, with 
even philosophy among them, is fundamentally sound; and his align- 
ment of librarianship with the metasciences is also sound because he 
correctly identifies its realities as formal and classifies them with the 
similar realities of its fellow disciplines, which are all derived from 
form-philosophy. Collectively, they constitute the only defensible basis 
for the knowledge business of librarianship, because turning away from 
the formal structure of knowledge means turning toward its empirical 
content. If the librarians go for content, however, they must either 
become encyclopedists who go for all of i t ,  or specialists who go for 
some of it. But Kaplan rejects both of these options, because encyclope- 
dism “is a possibility that has forever vanished,” whereas “a narrow 
specialism...would fail dismally”48 to perform the broad knowledge 
functions of librarianship. The library profession, he insists, must be 
classed with the metasciences. 
They have this centrality ...for an intellectual reason, because there is 
central to them the concept of structure, of order, of form, which 
seems...to be the central concern also of library science. I am unable to 
conceptualize any alternative. Either you are [humanists] interested 
in order, structure, form, or you are [scientists] interested in substance 
and content; and in the lattercase, you mustresign yourself to master-
ing some increasingly narrow subject area and to doing whatever you 
can...as little assistants or magic helpers ...to the people working in 
the area.49 
The close affinity of the metasciences with librarianship is thoroughly 
appropriate in the broadened sense of metascience as the inclusive study 
of human inference generally, though not in the narrow sense of exclu-
sively scientific inference. This broadening of the metasciences is 
important, for otherwise they do not qualify as the occupational peers of 
librarianship. When properly understood, however, librarianship and 
the metasciences are plainly meant for each other. But the postwar 
librarians have identified librarianship with information science, and 
the information scientists are “aligning themselves with the natural 
sciences, which deal with physical phen~mena.”~’ The librarians, 
meanwhile, must “deal with ideas and knowledge and their communi- 
cation; hence librarianship is much closer to the humanities than to the 
‘hard’ This contradiction between the humanistic realities 
of librarianship and the scientific outlook of the postwar librarians is 
tearing the profession apart. The excessive pragmatism of the librarians 
and their educators has thus far prevented them from formulating a 
defensible philosophy of librarianship. Nor have they been able to 
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recognize the intrinsic merit of Kaplan’s recommendations. The Ameri- 
can system of librarianship is therefore short-circuited at the battery- 
which explains why there is currently no juice in the system, and why 
the physical methods of science are inappropriate for studying the 
formal realities of librarianship. 
From Kaplan to Mead. From Kaplan’s “philosophy of library 
education, fragmentary and ill-defined though it may be,” says Jesse 
Shera, “must be derived the objectives of the library That 
strong endorsement of Kaplan’s symbolic views is closely related to the 
last recommendation offered by Shera to the library profession. “I 
submit that librarians must look to ‘symbolic interactionism’ for the 
proper foundation of a theory of l ib rar ian~hip .”~~Symbolic interaction- 
ism, which “refers to the [psychophysical] process by which people 
relate to their own minds and the minds of others,”” was created by 
George Herbert Mead, who rejected the study of social phenomena by 
mechanistic methods devised for the study of natural phenomena and 
imported into the social sciences from physics. Mead has thus become 
the nemesis of those social scientists who follow the physicists in assum- 
ing the identity of natural and social phenomena. The natural order isa 
monistic unity that includes everything physical and nothing else: i t  
does not resent being studied (because matter has no mind and cannot 
think), nor has i t  ever punched a scientist in the nose for writing 
something in his notes. But the social order, unlike the natural order, is 
an ontological dualism constituted by (1) an empirical social order, 
which consists of people as behavers who do things, and (2)an ideative 
social order, which consists of people as thinkers who know things. 
Humanists regard the empirical social order as secondary and instru- 
mental because it functions as the only means of access to the ideative 
social order; but scientists treat the ideative social order as nonexistent 
and regard the empirical social order as a subset of the natural order. 
Science, that is to say, studies the behavior of human beings without 
reference to their minds, whereas humanism studies their behavior 
instrumentally-as the symbolic means of access to their minds. Thus, 
by rejecting the monistic reduction of social orders to their physical 
manifestations and by accepting Cooley’s “theory of the mental nature 
of human society” (which regards human organizations “as existing in 
the minds of ...individuals”), symbolic interactionists argue that “the 
essential nature of society is found in the social bonds that exist between 
human beings through ideas and feelings. It therefore investigates 
the psychophysical interaction of the empirical social order and the 
ideative social order by studying the relationship between the physical 
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symbol and its symbolic referent. Accordingly, it regards human inter- 
action as social and symbolic, for “nearlyevery movement, sound, odor, 
or touch of another human being acts as a symbol which we learn to 
i n t e r ~ r e t . ” ~ ~This instrumental use of sensible symbols is fundamental 
in human communication, since most of what we know can be 
expressed as stimuli to be interpreted by others. Thus, “we can move our 
bodies in ways that can be seen,” we can control sounds that can be 
heard, and “the [physical] environment can be manipulated to create 
sensory information for others to per~eive.”~’The consequence of all 
this is the ability to communicate, for “any of these humanly produced 
stimuli can be employed as symbols which represent what we know,”58 
provided only that interactingcommunicants employ the same rules for 
attaching meanings to stimuli. This clarifies the communicative func- 
tion of physical symbols. We create symbolism by attaching subjective 
meanings to various kinds of physical data and using them as instru- 
ments of communication, and communication is impossible unless 
these data are made to function instrumentally (and invisibly) as sym- 
bolic signs: they must arouse ideas in the mind without getting in the 
way. 
If some [physical] object [or process] is to act as a sign, the interpreter 
must shift attention from...[itself] to its referent. Every stimulus ...p ro- 
vides us with information about itself. [But] a sign ...results in two 
types of knowledge-that which is intrinsic (knowledge about the 
sign) and that which is not (knowledge about the referent) ....This 
shift of attention is produced unconsciously ....Our attention is so 
thoroughly focused on the referent that signs are [wrongly] said to 
take on the meaning of that which they refer to [emphasis added].59 
The dual nature of the social phenomenon determines the metho- 
dologies of symbolic interactionism, which are essentially subjective 
because the meaning of things to the conscious self is basic and primary 
in human communication, whereas phenomena are instrumental and 
derived. But meaning belongs to the formal realities of the ideative 
social order, which can only be reached by going through the physical 
realities of the empirical social order. One does not simply react to the 
behavior of other people, that is to say: oneevaluates i t  subjectively (by 
interpreting i t  as i t  occurs) and acts in accordance with the subjective 
meanings one attaches to it. One cannot do this, however, without 
making inferences from others’ behavior about their intentions, which 
must be communicated by means of their behavior because intentions 
cannot be observed. There is no other way of dealing with the ideative 
social order: it can only be accessed symbolically by means of the 
empirical social order because human communication is an intersub- 
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which he shares with the other animals.”63 Their researches, therefore, 
“make no reference to man’s distinctive characteristic^,"^^ which set his 
rational forms of behavior apart from the behavior of nonhuman 
animals. 
A notable example is the reinforcement theorists, who emphasize 
operant conditioning and behavior modification. Their focus is on 
observables, the overt responses of organisms. From the study of rats, 
chickens, and other animals, they have shown the efficacy of rewards, 
or positive reinforcers, in shaping behavior. Aiming at “objective” 
knowledge, operant-oriented researchers contend that ...thinking, or 
mind, are subjective, and therefore inappropriate for science. They 
insist that the behavior of the human animal can be studied with the 
same concepts, the same techniques, and the same...success as in the 
study of other animals. 
The reinforcement ...[or analytical] approach to human behavior is 
based upon a positivistic conception of science. A basic premise of the 
positivist viewpoint ...is...the [monistic] contention that the behavior 
of all organisms is essentially similar and that conclusions obtained 
from the study of animal behavior can also explain human con- 
duct....Closely related [to this approach] is ...determinism, which 
views...animal and human action as sequential and invariable.@ 
The symbolic interactionist view of human behavior is the polar oppo-
site of this. It distinguishes all forms of instinctive behavior from the 
rational conduct of man, which constitutes a distinctively human kind 
of behavior controlled by symbolic processes implicit in thinking sub- 
jects who are constantly involved in the communication of knowledge. 
Distinctively human behavior, in other words, “is considered to be 
qualitatively different from nonhuman behavior, and therefore requires 
its own specialized concepts, theories, and research methods.”66 Sym- 
bolic interactionism, accordingly, is “grounded on [formal] assump- 
tions about man’s distinctive characteristics and on researches dealing 
with man him~elf”~’ as an active thinker who knows things and guides 
his behavior by what he knows; i t  cannot be grounded on the physical 
assumptions of scientific materialists about the commonalities of 
human and nonhuman animal behavior because man is the only 
animal who communicates with his fellows through the sophisticated 
use of symbols. 
Communication by means of significant symbols ...involves words or 
gestures intended to convey [subjective] meaning ....It is not the [phys- 
ical] noise of the words or the physical movement of the ges- 
ture ...which communicates, but the meaning for which the noise 
or...movement stands as a symbol. Both the communicator and the 
observer have ...to learn the meaning of ...words or gestures in order to 
communicate symbolically, ...[although] communication by natural 
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signs takes place instinctively and spontaneously [among all of the 
anirna~sl.~’ 
It is therefore the peculiar nature of human subjectivity which explains 
the unique ability of human beings tocommunicate symbolically, since 
the meaningful manipulation of significant symbols requires specifi- 
cally human conceptual and linguistic skills that are lacking in the rest 
of the animals. 
The focus of symbolic interactionism on the study of distinctively 
human behavior also accounts for its rejection of analytical methods, 
which stress the observer’s objectivity and impersonal detachment from 
the empirical social order as in science, and its acceptance of recognitive 
methods, which require the observer’s intimate and personal involve- 
ment with the empirical social order as in the humanities. Most of the 
social scientists, “impressed with the dramatic achievements of the 
natural sciences, have sought to a p ly  similar concepts and techniques 2to the study of human beings.” This is a mistake, according to the 
interactionist perspective, because “human conduct is guided by inter- 
pretation and intention” as i t  emerges under the intelligent control of 
an active conscious self; it is not triggered by “mechanical, automatic 
reactions to stimuli.”70 Insofar as “human action and interaction are 
voluntaristic or intentional, they are.. .emergent and unpredictable. ’”’ 
Symbolic interactionism thus requires researchers to investigate the 
covert processes of subjective interpretation and volition by which 
rational behavior is constructed and controlled; and they cannot do this, 
since those processes occur only within the intelligent consciousness of 
human beings, without thinking themselves into the skins of the people 
they study and viewing things from the inside out. This requirement 
always baffles the detached impartial observer, for human subjectivity is 
the one thing science cannot study objectively: you cannot hover aloof 
and distant over the people whose subjective processes you are studying 
by refusing to experience the roles and functions they perform in the 
social order. The subjective processes which generate rational behavior 
in a human being must be communicated toobservers through intimate 
familiarity with the empirical lives of the people they observe. There is 
no  other way to do it. Yet, the analytical procedures of science constitute 
the dominant mode of inquiry in all of the behavioral disciplines, where 
researchers shun immediate experience with and direct examination of 
the empirical social order. But “no amount of simply observing behav- 
ior from the outside will provide an understanding of actors’ views ...and 
hence...of their conduct,”72 in spite of the overwhelming preference for 
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such things as ambitious theories, intricate research designs, elaborate 
models, and servile adherence to the canons of scientific inquiry. 
What is needed is a return to the empirical social world. No theoriz-
ing, however ingenious, and no observance of scientific protocols, 
however meticulous, can substitute for developinga direct familiarity 
with what is actually going on in human group life. Symbolic inter- 
actionists encourage first-hand acquaintance with the sphere of life 
under study. Thus, their preferred research techniques tend to be 
sensitive participation and direct observation, rather than experimen- 
tation under artificially controlled conditions. This demands inti- 
mate contact with what is going on, free exploration in an area of 
concern, getting close to the people involved in it, seeing action in a 
variety of situations, noting problems and observing how they are 
handled, being party to conversations, watching life as it flows along. 
The nature of the empirical social world must be experienced, discov- 
ered, dug out by a direct careful and probing examination of that 
The symbolic interactionist imperative, in other words, is to respect the 
instrumental nature of the empirical social order as the means by which 
the ideative social order is communicated, and to “organize a methodo- 
logical stance to reflect that respect.”74 
The following assumptions about symbolic interactionism are 
derived from the requirements of cognitive consistency in the study of 
formal objects. They are necessarily different from the physical assump- 
tions of science, which aligns ratiocination with factual observation^.^^ 
T h e  formal realities of m i n d  cannot be k n o w n  emfiirically because 
they cannot be observed: they can only be recognized and evaluated 
philosophically through communication by means of observable sym- 
bols. The two general theories of knowledge are rationalism, which 
goes by the coherence theory of truth and utilizes the referential capabil- 
ities of natural language, and empiricism, which follows the correspon- 
dence theory of truth and exploits the descriptive capacities of 
mathematics. Symbolic interactionism belongs to the former because i t  
studies formal objects which are communicated by natural language 
but cannot be described mathematically, and rationality is its only 
criterion of truth. Factual propositions, on the other hand, are evaluated 
by the dual criteria of rationality and observability, because the corre- 
spondence theory of truth combines the necessary condition of rational 
consistency with the sufficient condition of empirical observability: one 
explains something provisionally, looks carefully at what the explana- 
tion is, and adjusts the explanation to fit the facts of observation. 
Factual statements are therefore “safer”than formal statements, because 
formal objects are immune to experimental testing: they cannot be put 
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under a microscope or heated with a bunsen burner to see how they 
“behave.” With formal propositions, however, “the round will be won 
if logical consistency [alone] is respected”-that is to say, if the rules of 
rationality within their ideative system are not breached.76 
H u m a n  beings are intelligent subjects living in two environments: 
(1) the physical environment, which ultimately includes all the matter 
and energy of the cosmos, and (2) the cultural environment, which 
includes all ideative realities available for study outside of the subjective 
consciousness of individuals. If man lives within the physical landscape 
of the universe, so to speak, he also lives in the cultural “weather”of his 
fellow human beings. Thus, the physical environment is shared by all of 
the animals; but only “man can have a culture-an elaborate set of 
meanings and values-shared by members of a society, which guides 
much of his behavior.”77 
Intelligent subjects select, interpret, reject, accept, and transform 
their environments by determining the purposes and directions of their 
rational behavior and controlling its construction; they are not passive 
organisms responding mechanically to internal or external conditions. 
This proposition constitutes “an important tenet of most humanistic 
views of conduct,’’ which assumes that “human beings are ...p artici- 
pants in creating their own de~tinies.”~’ They construct their environ- 
ments, for “whatever may actually be ‘out there,’ individuals will 
structure their worlds ...by what they perceive and conceive them to 
be.’”’ 
Man is not a passive organism buffeted by organic drives and environ- 
mental forces, such as sexual impulses or organizational structures. 
He is an active agent, who constructs his behavior in the process of 
social interaction. He selects and interprets his environment, and thus 
in some sense creates it. Man’s behavior, therefore, is not wholly 
determined by antecedent conditions, because rational conduct is 
constructed in a process he controls as it emerges from him.” 
This constructive process depends on the interpretation and communi- 
cation of meanings, because “human beings normally intercept what 
others are doing, or intend to do, and construct their behavior in terms 
of what they take into account.’J81 Thus people define their situations 
and “indicate their definitions to one another in order to interpret each 
other’s meanings within the situations in which they are acting.”” The 
meaning of social interaction is therefore determined by a subjective 
process of self-indication: it is not the result of antecedent conditions 
but “depends on what is taken intoaccount and assessed in the situation 
in which behavior is actually formed.” 
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An individual makes indications to himself of things in his surround- 
ings, and thus guides his actions by what he knows ....Insteadof being 
passive, therefore, he selectively participates in his environment ....It 
is how he interprets things in the action he is constructing that 
determines his behavior, which is not caused by internal drives or 
external stimuli. The process of self-indication exists in itsown right, 
and must be accepted and studied as 
Access to the human cultural environment is provided only 
through symbols. “Man has a distinctive capacity for symbolic com- 
rnuni~a t ion’ ’~~which enables him to think and to encode ideas in 
objective reports that go into the world for others to utilize and, in some 
cases, to store for retrieval and reuse. This is accomplished by symbol- 
ism through the ob‘ectification of thought. Since “thinking is strictly a Lsymbolic process,” however, and since the physical symbol is the only 
objective means of communication, the cultural store of objectified 
ideas is accessible only through symbolism. 
All aspects of specifically rational behavior are symbolic. Distinc-
tively human interaction with one’s self and others is always carried out 
by means of symbols and their interpretations. Rational behavior can- 
not be explained, therefore, unless thinking and language are under- 
stood because human beings attach meanings to symbolic stimuli and 
act on the basis of those meanings, which “are socially derived through 
interaction with others rather than inherent in the stimuli 
themselves.”tx 
The subjective meanings of symbols can be learned by human 
beings only through communication. Rational conduct is “specifically 
learned in symbolic communication, ’”’ where the self selectively con- 
structs its social objects from its interactions with the symbolicenviron- 
ment. Thus, “all social objects, including the self as a social object, 
become meaningful definitions of situations because they are inter- 
preted as such by the individual self.’’88 But subjective meanings and 
interpretations, even though learned by a self, cannot be observed: they 
must be communicated to others or remain forever with the self. This 
makes communication indispensable to the exploration of subjective 
questions. It also means that understanding rational behavior requires 
observers to account for the meanings of things to an interpreting 
self-something they cannot do unless those meanings are communi- 
cated to them through symbols. 
Natural language can refer to the subjective realities of mind; but 
human subjectivity can neither be described by applied mathematics 
nor explored by pure mathematics. “Man is distinctive in having lan- 
guage,”89 which is the natural consequence of his unique ability to 
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think. The natural languages are referential, however, whereas mathe- 
matics is descriptive. This means that natural language can refer the 
mind to ideas about anything. But mathematics is securely tied to the 
natural universe: i t  can only describe physical actualities or explore 
physical possibilities. Mathematics is thus “an instrument for applica- 
tion to physical problems.’’w It was invented as a way of accounting for 
physical objects and processes in the world of matter and energy, which 
cannot be adequately described in words. “The axioms of arithmetic 
and geometry are based on the physical processes of counting objects 
and measuring distance^";'^ and the differential calculus “is a direct 
attempt to put physical notions of velocity andacceleration into precise 
term^."'^ Mathematics is thus the intellectual technology of material- 
ism, an artificial language whose “utmost abstractions are the true 
weapons with which to control our thought of concrete fa~t”’~-which 
explains why mathematics cannot control our thinking about abstract 
form. Natural language, on the other hand, “is the primary mechanism 
leading to the individual’s mind and self”;94 its verbal abstractions, 
therefore, function as our best means of intersubjective communication. 
It is obvious that symbolic interactionism has great significance for 
communication theory. The mind, by using the human body as its 
technology of interaction, can review information from the world and 
program its voluntary movements to act in or upon the world. Thus, we 
can utilize physical data-either as objects of analytical study for the 
realization of technical ends, or as the symbolic instruments of subjec-
tive communication. But the objective study of physical data-as- 
phenomena, in which knowing is instrumental to sensing truly, is 
virtually never distinguished from the subjective study of ideas, in 
which sensation is instrumental to knowing and to communicating 
what is known. This distinction is basic, however, for we can neither 
think nor communicate thought without utilizing common nouns, 
formal abstractions representing nothing real except the concrete 
instances which exemplify them. The physical datum is therefore indis- 
pensable to the human study of anything outside one’s own conscious- 
ness. It performs two informational functions, however, which are 
constantly confused by materialists: it functions in hard science as the 
primary id quod, that physical entity which is studied; but in the human 
sciences i t  becomes the instrumental id quod, that physical entity by 
means of which subjective realities are studied and communicated. 
Hence, the factual datum is essential in creating and communicating 
the concepts and images of both science and the human arts. The only 
issue here “is the nature of the relevance,” since facts “are as relevant to 
metaphysics as to experimental science, but not in the same way”: they 
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are “instrumental to the discovery of metaphysical truth,” but “consti- 
tutive as evidence ...[in] experimental science.”=That issuecomesdown 
to an essential difference between the analytical and recogni tive 
methodologies; it must be clearly understood, therefore, because “sense 
knowledge is either instrumental [to the recognition of subjective reali- 
ties] or it is not.”96 This fact often escapes the materialist, who may 
believe, for example, that he is studying music when he is actually 
studying musical acoustics. “If sense knowledge is instrumental, then it 
is a means by which we know [subjective] things. If it is not instrumen- 
tal, then the sense object is that which is But “one kind of 
knowledge cannot be partly instrumental to...other kinds of knowled- 
ge....It is wholly so, or not at all [emphasis added].”g8 The ability to 
detect physical data by means of the senses is thus the necessary condi- 
tion of human communication, the indispensable means of recognizing 
all subjective realities except one’s own; but the sufficient condition can 
be met only in the mind’s ability to recognize the subjective realities 
symbolized by sensation. It is the common failure of materialists to 
distinguish the two informational functions of physical data in human 
communication that underlies the recurring crises of communications 
theory, for the difference between the objective study of factual data and 
the subjective use of factual data for studying ideas is absolute: what you 
are studying is one thing; but learning from your study, and communi- 
cating what you have learned from it, are entirely different matters. 
Symbolic interactionism thus constitutes a very real alternative to 
the analytical methodologies of scientific matter-philosophy in the 
study of human behavior. It originates with attempts by social psychol- 
ogists to steer a middle course between the Scylla of psychology, with its 
kinds-of-people theories, and the Charybdis of sociology, with its kinds- 
of-situation theories. The battle over these two perspectives began in 
1908, when the cases for psychological and sociological determinism 
were presented by Edward A. Ross, who argued that a child raised 
without social interaction under the influence of psychologists who 
minimized the importance of social forces could only become an idiot, 
and by William McDougall, who argued that human behavior was 
caused by instincts, powerful impulses, and innate predispositions to 
act: take them away, he said, and a person would be paralyzed and 
unable to function-“like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring 
has been removed. ”99 These arguments, which have “persisted in subtle 
but significant ways right down to the present time,” have created 
dissatisfaction “with the fact that there are two social psychologies 
thriving in the land. ’’loo The psychological version “comes perilously 
close to being a social psychology without people” because i t  treats 
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human interaction “as though the important differences between the 
human and nonhuman environments could be ignored.””’ The socio- 
logical version, on the other hand, makes “different but no less serious 
errors” by assuming that people are like “empty receptacles into which 
culture is simply poured,” that they are more or less equivalent as 
receptacles, and that “the process by which they are filled can be taken 
for granted.”’02 Thus, psychology continues to push its kinds-of-people 
theories, which imply that inherent characteristics determine human 
behavior, while sociology clings to its kinds-of-situation theories, 
which portray people as mindless organisms responding mechanically 
to impersonal forces expressed through their environmentally induced 
behavior. Small wonder that symbolic interactionism calls for a plague 
on both their houses! 
The basic weakness of either perspective is its determinism, “the 
tendency to treat human behavior as the product of antecedent condi- 
tions, and to see people as surrounded by internal or external forces that 
play upon them and determine their b e h a ~ i o r . ” ’ ~ ~  These approaches, 
which are derived from the physical presuppositions of science, deny the 
possibility of voluntarily creating indeterminate behavior because they 
deny the existence of active subjects who intentionally orchestrate the 
rational forms of their behavior in an intelligent process of interaction 
with the world and with other intelligent subjects. But symbolic interac- 
tionists tend to reject the natural, biological, social, and psychological 
variants of hard determinism, and to accept only the softer forms of 
cultural determinism which give people a significant amount of control 
over their actions. They assert, therefore, the undetermined quality of 
much human behavior, which they see as a rational but unpredictable 
performance conducted by an active but unpredictable intelligence. 
Thus, symbolic interactionism becomes a mediating perspective, an 
a1 ternative view which focuses on realities that are neither in people nor 
in their environments, but in the cultural process of interaction itself. 
These realities, which are largely but not wholly interpersonal, require 
observers to pay as much attention to the behavior of others as they give 
to the behavers they study or to their social system and its organizational 
structures. And because of this, interactionists also tend to reject physi- 
cal explanations of behavior, which are derived from such things as the 
formulation and testing of hypotheses, organizational theories, 
structural-functional analysis, systems theory, survey research, histori- 
cal and comparative studies, and operations research. Instruments like 
these, according to symbolic interaction theory, are not able to cope 
with the critical study of human subjectivity because they cannot deal 
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with the tricky interface between the physical symbol and its metaphysi- 
cal referent. 
From Mead to Popper. The philosophies of George Herbert Mead 
and Karl Popper are similar in some ways, though not in every respect. 
Popper is far more systematic and comprehensive than Mead. But both 
accept the existence of highly active selves, who interpret and modify 
their environments by directing their attention and diverting their 
energies to whatever interests them; both believe that the self “emerges 
in interaction wi &...other selves and with theartefacts and other objects 
of his environment”;’04 and both allege, while believing that predisposi- 
tions to perceive the world and to learn language are unique biological 
potentials of man, that the self must actively construct its own percep- 
tual and linguistic realities. Thus Popper regards “the view that our 
perceptions are ‘given’ to us as a mistake,” arguing that we must learn to 
“see,” for example, because vision is not passive “but consists in an 
active interpretation of coded inputs”; and heconcludes that we are able 
to learn the complex symbols and meanings of language and to interact 
with our natural, social, and cultural environments because “we have a 
genetically based innate curiosity and an exploring instinct which 
makes us active.”’05 Mead could only concur wholeheartedly with this; 
but he was a pragmatist who disliked Plato, and he may have had 
serious reservations about the blatant dualism of Popper’s revised 
platonism. 
Popper follows Plato, “who transcended the duality of body and 
mind by proposing a third world of forms or ideas,”’w in dividing the 
intellectual pattern-world of traditional form-philosophy into its sub- 
jective and objective components. This division sorts all reality into 
three logically distinct and separate worlds, which Popper calls Worlds 
1, 2,and 3. “The whole material world (the entire cosmos, with all its 
matter and energy, including human brains), is World 1,”107 which 
contains everything that exists in a physical way. Thus World 1 cir- 
cumscribes all physical objects, processes, forces (and force fields), and 
conditions, which include all biological and inorganic organizations of 
matter and energy and all artifacts created by human beings (e.g., tools, 
machines, documents, works of art, music) for the achievement of 
rational ends. In studying the natural realities of World 1, therefore, the 
mode of communication and the learning process are natural. Every- 
thing in the personal psyche of an individual, on the other hand, is 
World 2,“the world of your subjective experiences, which includes all 
of your thoughts, memories, ideas, imaginings, creativities, and soon. It 
is the world of your inner spiritual life, the world you know and live in 
all the time you are conscious, from the moment you wake u p  until you 
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go to sleep. That’s World 2,”’08 the world of the human mind with all of 
its predispositions, desires, and intentions. It isan active, critical world, 
which includes all of the subjective processes of knowing: it therefore 
constitutes the private world of your subjective conscious intelligence, 
which creates all of the ideas you are capable of thinking; and i t  can only 
be “known in  others by inference from symbolic 
World 3, finally, contains all of the objective products of knowing, 
which include all ideas of any kind whatever that areavailable for study 
outside of the individual conscious intelligence. In studying the formal 
realities of World 3, however, the mode of communication and the 
learning process are “not natural,” as in  the study of physical phenom- 
ena, “but cultural and social,”’’0 since they exist outside of the mind in  
an  objective but nonphysical way and cannot be sensed. Nevertheless, 
“they are powerful tools for changing World 1,” although they can 
affect physical realities “only through human intervention”:”’ the 
objective ideas of World 3, that is to say, can interact with the subjective 
mind in World 2; and the subjective mind in World 2 can act in turn 
upon the phenomena of World 1. World 3 thus constitutes the whole 
domain of civilized culture constructed by human creativity. “The 
music you hear all around you ...is from World 3. We live in  thecultural 
environment of World 3,” which is just as objective and “every bit as real 
as the physical environment of World 1.”1’2 What you are doing when- 
ever you express yourself in any way constitutes World 3 behavior, 
because “the whole of culture and civilization, and particularly of 
language, is World 3.”113 
World 3 is the world of knowledge in the objective sense ....It com- 
prises the expressions of scientific, literary and artistic ideas ...pre-
served in codified form in libraries, in museums and in all records of 
human culture. In their material composition of paper and ink, books 
are in World 1, but the knowledge encoded in the print is in World 3, 
and ...[the situation is similar] for pictures and all other artefacts. 
[Some] most important components of World 3 are the theoretical 
systems comprising scientific problems and the critical arguments 
generated by discussion of these problems ....World 3 comprises the 
records of the intellectual efforts of all mankind through all ages up  to 
the present- i t  is] what we may call the cultural heritage [of theElrl .human race]. 
Separating the objective component of the formal order from its 
subjective component does not prevent either of those components from 
interacting with each other or with the natural order. But it does oppose 
the modern philosophies of psychophysical para l le l i~m,”~ which not 
only separate the natural and formal orders but seal them off completely 
and prevent them from influencing one other in any meaningful way; 
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and it  accepts the Greek disjunction of human reason and the senses, 
which creates the traditional philosophy of psychophysical interaction- 
ism, also known as dualist interactionism, or “the commonsense view 
that people are composed of twodistinct and separate entities.”l16Thus, 
“the nonmaterial entity from World 2, the world of the spirit, is the 
self-conscious mind-the soul or psyche which constitutes the self”; and 
“the material entity from World 1, the world of physical realities, is the 
human brain and the body it This effectively demolishes 
the foundation of scientific identity theory, the parallelist belief that the 
mind and the brain are the same thing or different views of the same 
thing, because it identifies thinking with the human mind in World 2 
and implies that the brain, which constitutes an extremely important 
part of the human body in World 1, is not a thinking organ: it is a 
behavioral control center used by thinking. “Anything the body does to, 
with, or for us,” according to Eccles, “is done through the brain, by 
means of the brain.””’ The natural activities of the human body, 
therefore-whether voluntary, involuntary, internal and covert, exter- 
nal and overt, or whatever-are all controlled by the brain; but there is 
no evidence that the brain does any thinking: that notion results from 
wishful thinking in the minds of monistic materialists who deny the 
existence of minds and define thinking in physical terms. 
Dualistic interactionism holds that the self-conscious mind and the 
nonconscious brain interact with each other in both direc-
tions....Popper and I believe, asdualist interactionists, that the subtle- 
ty ofour whole existence lies in these two entities. That’sdualism: the 
spiritual or mental side of human existence is rooted in the mind; the 
material side is rooted in the brain; and there is interaction between 
them ....This interaction should be conceived as a flow of information, 
but not as a flow of energy. Whenever I say anything or  write some- 
thing, for example, there is an  intense flow of information between 
my mind and my brain, in which my thoughts alter and control my 
brain. Whenever we think or express what we are thinking, there are 
very fast, intensive interactions both forwards and backwards across 
the frontier between our thoughts and what we are sayin And wedo 
that all the time, in every aspect of our waking lives. 1 1 8 .  
This ties the human aspect of the traditional mind-body problem to 
Popper’s “brain-mind liaison,”’20 the frontier of interaction between 
the mind and that part of the brain which enables the mind to interact 
with the rest of its brain and thereby with the rest of its body. Thus, the 
mind “is intimately associated with its brain ...and is not ...directly asso- 
ciated with the remainder of the body.”lZ1 That simplification should be 
avoided because it creates false problems; and “the body-mind problem 
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of the philosophers is just such a simplification.”’22 The real problem, 
according to Eccles, “is a brain-mind problem and nothing else.”lB 
The neocortex is a great folded sheet in our skulls, about 20 inches 
square by 1/8 of an  inch thick, which contains everything directly 
associated with the mind ....There are more than ten thousand million 
nerve cells in this sheet, and all of them are connected to one another 
....These individual neurons are arranged in small ensembles, or 
modules....This arrangement in modules, with about 4,000 nervecells 
per module, reduces the number of functional units ...to something 
like 3 or 4 million ....The individual neurons are thus ...in perpetual 
communication ...over the whole surface of the brain ....Its 4 million 
modules are interconnected, too....These modules are always lighting 
up, as it were, with patterned excitations ....If you could look at  this 
patterning, if you could take off the top of my skull and observe my 
brain with the right scientific equipment for recording simultaneous 
electrical events, you would see that my brain is in a scintillating 
state...when I am thinking deeply, with countless electrical patterns 
occurring on it ....The brain with its 4 million modules, as a matterof 
fact, resembles a great TV screen-except that TV patterns are gener- 
ated from only about a million modules. These neocortical modules ... 
constitute the basis of our whole brain action in relation to the 
mind.lZ4 
The T V  screen, however, displays spatial patterns exclusively, whereas 
the neocortex creates both spatial and temporal patterns. In terms of 
spatial patterns, therefore, the cortical modules indeed resemble a T V  
screen, which “has an infinite capacity for displaying still or moving 
pictures of all kinds-by generating patterns from only a million 
modules.”’25 This says a lot about the tremendous patterning capacity 
of the liaison brain, because “our neocortical modules outnumber those 
of the T V  screen by 4 to 1!”’26 But the temporal patterns of the neocortex 
are even more revealing. Take the sound spectrum, for example: the 
eighty-eight keys of a piano do not amount to much when compared 
with the 4 million modules of the liaison brain; and yet the piano, 
“which has the same four arameters as the brain, creates the whole vast 
richness of piano music.’” Just think of what that means: the marvel- 
ous performances of brilliant compositions by geniuses like Beethoven 
and Mozart “are produced with only 88 modules, whereas the human 
brain has 4 million. The brain, in other words, is like a piano with 4 
million keys; and the mind is the piano player.”’% Thus, the joy of 
music, like the very wonder of being human itself, is the result of 
interaction between the mind and its brain. 
This brain-mind liaison suggests the instrument-instrumentalist 
analogy so repugnant to the monist-materialists, who reduce the whole 
of reality to mindless machinery for which there are no intelligent 
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machinists. For Popper, however, who accepts the platonic notion ofa 
ghost in the machine, the human psyche indeed uses its somatic 
machinery as its only means of interacting with its physical and cultural 
environments. The mind-body relationship, therefore, is something 
like the relationships of driver-to-automobile, viewer-to-TV, pianist-to- 
piano, pilot-to-ship, programmer-to-computer, and so on. “Like the 
pilot of a ship,” says Eccles following Popper who follows Plato, “the 
self in each of us observes and takes action at the same time”’29 by 
evaluating information from its sensory system and controlling the 
behavior of its motor system. This we can do because “we normally have 
access to our brain^,"'^' which are to us as computers are to their 
programmers: “the human brain, and the body whose behavior i t  con-
trols, is the computer; and the conscious self, whether you call it the 
psyche or the soul or the spirit, is the computer pr~grammer.”’~’ This 
psychophysical relationship, expressed in Popper’s important analogy 
of mind/programmer and brain/computer similarities, has been elabo- 
rated by Eccles: 
It is useful to think of the brain as an instrument, as our personal 
computer, if you like ....But if the brain is an  instrument, we are the 
instrumentalists ....You are not your brain, in other words; but youare 
the programmer of your brain. You are very like the computer pro- 
grammer, because you program your brain to do  all sorts of things, 
[and] you read all kinds of patterns out of it....We are always doing 
that to our brains, which are like computers only infinitely more 
intricate and marvelous. This is a simple analogy that everyone can 
understand. It helps us to see how the thoughts, perceptions, ideas 
and memories which make u p  our experiences can be programmed 
into our personal brain-computers so that we can express them to 
others, how we can receive back the expressions of others, and thus 
how whole new complexes of thoughts and understandings can be 
created. All this, of course, is a highly selective process. We choose 
whatever we like from the myriad outputs of the brain by focusing ... 
on this or that....And we do  have the ability to concentrate our 
attention-to switch our brain,as itwere, ontoanythingwecho~se.’~~ 
This explains Popper’s brain-mind liaison perfectly; and “the very 
latest research on the nemortex suggests that the brain actually has this 
ability to function as a sophisticated computer versatile enough to do 
everything we have imagined it could These are important 
considerations, for “we are each given a unique computer, our brain, 
which functions as our sole means of interacting with-of receiving 
from and giving to-the physical and cultural worlds in which we are 
immersed. That is the essential thing about dualistic interacti~nism.”’~~ 
But that is also an issue which has always separated matter- 
philosophy and form-philosophy. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
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Popper’s platonistic rejection of materialism has elicited materialism’s 
democritean rejection of Popper. Descartes really started something 
when he retained the two worlds of form and matter from traditional 
philosophy but followed early modern thought in accepting only effi- 
cient causes and rejecting all final, formal, and material causes: this 
effectively eliminates all metaphysical concepts of teleological 
causation-by-pull, confines all causes to the physical world, resurrects 
the billiard-ball concept of atomic causation-by-push, and demotes the 
secondary qualities of matter to near-zero status. It means that nothing 
in Worlds 2 and 3 can cause anything within themselves, in each other, 
or in World 1; but i t  also means that World 1 can “cause” Worlds 2 and 
3, which must somehow evolve out of matter and energy. Thus, “mate- 
rialists don’t exactly deny the mind”; but they confinei t  to a prison of 
their own making, and “they don’t give it  any effective action on the 
brain, or therefore on our performance.”’35 If their account of the 
mind-brain relationship is correct, then we ourselves, as conscious 
human beings, “would merely be the passive spectators of the perfor- 
mances of our own bodies as dictated by our brains”; and we would be 
deluded by “our beliefs that we can really make decisions, and that we 
can have some control over our actions.”’36 
In general, materialistic theories hold that mental events can have no 
effective action on brain events-that no  matter what you think or 
desire, your brain will go right on performingin itsown way whether 
you like it or not, because there is nothing you can doabout it. Thus, 
the physical world of the brain is closed to any conceivable outside 
influence, such as the mind’s influence on the brain as postulated by 
dualist interactionism. This closedness of the physical world is what 
materialists insist upon.. 
Popper has shown us a way to avoid the paradoxes of psychophysical 
parallelism by opening the closed system of materialism in the scientific 
study of social, psychological, and cultural realities. He has done it by 
creating a humanistic philosophy of science in an age that likes tocreate 
scientific philosophies of humanism. This has caused an uproar among 
materialists; but it should also cause rejoicing in the human sciences, 
which include librarianship and library education, because “a vast 
amount of our experience of the most subtle or trivial kinds is explained 
by this hypothesis [of dualist interactionisml-things which cannot be 
explained at all by materialist theories of the mind and the brain.”’38 
Toward an Alternative Librarianship and Library Education 
As librarians and library educators, we have clearly aligned our- 
selves with the wrong intellectual tradition because we have failed to see 
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that librarianship as formal structure, not physical substance. We must 
somehow get this truth through our heads, because virtually all of our 
false assumptions and wrong ways of doing everything are derived from 
the mistaken belief that librarianship is a thing of substance. This is best 
seen, perhaps, against the background of Shera’s “Chicago philoso- 
phy” of librarianship and library education. 
Librarianship is rooted in epistemology-knowledge about knowl- 

edge itself ....Librarianshifi is the management of human 

Rnowledge-[it is] the most inter-disciplinary of all the disciplines ... 

and because it is concerned with the philosophy of knowledge i t  is 

potentially the most philosophical of all the professions. It 

should...[be]a synthesis of the human intellectual adventure ....There-

fore, the primary aim of education for librarianship should be the 

training of the intellect in matters pertaining to human knowledge, 

and its goal should be the achievement of the highest wisdom in 





Librarianship should therefore be an intellectual profession based on 
the formal structure of ideas and organized by knowledge theory; but i t  
has become an empirical mechanics based on the material substance of 
physical data and operated by action theory. Thus, Machlup has 
observed that “library science is clearly empirical in all its aspects,”and 
that “every phase of research in this field is pra~tical-empirical.~’~~~He 
was absolutely right, of course, for today’s librarianship is unfortu-
nately that way; but he could not have been more wrong, because he 
overlooks the all-pervasive anti-intellectualism which has converted 
library science into the ultrapragmatic perversion he perceives it to be. 
Shera, who sees this problem clearly, has ended his lifelong involvement 
in the library profession with a parting swipe at the simplicity and 
undesirable consequences of its pragmatism. 
In the American character, there has [always] been a strong strain 

of ...pragmatism, and this is ...clearly evident ...in librarianship. The 

major figures in ...American librarianship were doers rather than 

thinkers; they were concerned with process rather than purpose. 

[Thus] they devised and taught in their library schools routines and 

procedures [for handling documents], and with the advent of online 





This sentiment is familiar to librarians, as Shera has made similar 
statements before. What may not be familiar to those unfamiliar with 
philosophy, however, is the fact that pragmatism and anti-
intellectualism are more or less synonymous, as are their antonyms, 
rationalism, and intellectualism. The overly pragmatic outlook of 
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American librarianship in all things, which merely reflects the all- 
inclusive nature of the larger American pragmatism, is responsible for 
the vigorous anti-intellectualism of today’s librarians. It was not until 
his own day, according to William James, that pragmatism “has ...g en- 
eralized itself, become conscious of a universal mission, pretended to a 
conquering destiny. I believe in that destiny,”’42 he says-and so do the 
librarians he inspired with that belief. The United States has always 
been a nation of talented tinkers: there is something to the quip that 
pragmatism is a philosophy for cowboys and engineers who dislike 
abstract ideas; but pragmatism is the beloved national philosophy of 
America, and attacking i t  can be as dangerous as criticizing baseball or 
apple pie. Hunt defends it as “plausible reasoning,” for example, which 
permits us, when faced with a problem, “to make a skilled guess at an 
answer” without coming “to that answer by formal deductive means”; 
he even calls i t  “our natural mode of reasoning,” arguing that “we are 
pragmatists by nature,” and that “our pragmatism ...is not anti-
intellectual” because it constitutes the kind of “effective intellectuality” 
that appeals to practical people e~erywhere.’~~ For all that, however, 
pragmatism and anti-intellectualism are so similar as to be almost 
identical. We find “the signs of revolt against intelle~tualism”’~~ in 
scores of writers; but “in James pragmatism [actually] becomes a revolt 
against ‘intellectualism’ because he tacitly identified this with rational- 
ism.9 9  146 And James despised rationalism: it “is far too intellectualistic” 
for pragmatism, which therefore “turns her back upon the intellectual- 
ist point of view So, pragmatismal t~gether .” ’~~ suggests anti- 
intellectualism. Anti-intellectualism, meanwhile, also smacks of 
pragmatism, for i t  “suggests the revulsion from ideology and the a 
przori, from the abstract thought of the centuryanda half precedingrthe 
1890~1....It recalls the influence and prestige of William James,”’47 
which extends to writers as different as Durkheim and Sorel. Pragma- 
tism, especially when based on the natural realism of James and Dewey, 
is notorious for exalting action over thought; and anti-intellectualism 
“is virtually equivalent to Jamesian pragmatism”’48-although many 
pragmatists continue to resent that term for describing their tough- 
minded philosophy. All of the above, furthermore, was acknowledged 
by William James himself, who placed pragmatism squarely in the 
mainstream of Western matter-philosophy. 
It agrees with [materialistic] nominalism ...in always appealing to 
particulars; with [materialistic] utilitarianism in emphasizing practi- 
cal aspects; with [materialistic] positivism in its disdain for verbal 
solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions. All of 
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these [variants of materialism], you see, are anti-intellectualkt ten-
dencies. Against rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragma- 
tism [as a pretension and a method] is fully armed and militant ....It 
has no dogmas and no doctrines save its [materialistic] method.’*’ 
Despite its widespread acceptance among information professionals, 
therefore, pragmatism is an indefensible philosophical stance in the 
librarian for two reasons: (1) i t  constitutes an  experientially biased 
philosophy of action derived from scientific materialism; and (2)librar-
ians are in the knowledge business, not in the action business. The 
gut-mistake of the American librarians and their educators is the forlorn 
attempt to reduce their knowledge problems to action theory in order to 
solve them scientifically. But action theory cannot resolve the knowl- 
edge problems of librarianship because theories of knowledge (episte- 
mology) are not reducible to theories of action (ethics/societology/ 
science) or vice versa; and the net result of their spectacular failure to 
resolve knowledge problems scientifically is the measure of their anti- 
intellectualism. 
There is a way out of our anti-intellectual pragmatism, however, in 
the critical philosophies of humanism. We could take a lesson from 
anthropology, for example, which has found a formula for creating the 
philosophy of any discipline by spelling out its metaphysics, its episte- 
mology, and its ethics.lM Here is a way for us to construct our own 
philosophy of librarianship, because metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics constitute the irreducibles of philosophical analysis-the neces-
sary ingredients in any recipe for cooking up  a critical philosophy of 
anything. We will have to apply this formula to ourselves in order todo 
it. We should do it in order, too, by formulating our metaphysical 
beliefs about the realities we actually deal with before considering the 
derivative problems of thinking (epistemology) or acting (ethics) in 
relation to those realities. Our metaphysics must come first, though, 
because metaphysics deals with fundamental Being, with actually being 
real. We ourselves have to be in order to think, for unless we exist in the 
first place we can neither think nor do anything at all; and our realities 
are like unto us: they too, must be, for if they do not exist wecan neither 
know nor do anything about them. 
What, then, are the ultimate realities of librarianship? Do they 
reduce to atomic complexes with electrochemical properties in the 
physical world of matter and energy? Or do they consist of matterless 
patterns in the formal world of the spirit? Most would agree, I think, 
that our ultimate realities are related to information. But information 
means physical data to the matter-philosophers and ideas to the form- 
philosophers. We can therefore accept ideas (and reject data) as our 
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ultimate realities or vice versa; but we cannot have it  both ways, for ideas 
belong to the formal universe whereas data are experiential givens in the 
physical universe. This means that the implicit ambiguity of “informa- 
tion” must be resolved in order to eliminate theconfusion which results 
“when the same word, information, is used in a dozen different mean- 
ings in different areas of inq~iry.”’~’ Since natural realities exist only in 
physical or nonphysical ways, however, these mu1 tiple meanings are all 
subsets of only two basic meanings: either information reduces tophysi- 
cal data (something in the sensible world) or i t  reduces to ideative forms 
(something in the intelligible world). We must make an intelligent 
choice here, and the choice we make will determine what we think 
about, how we think about it ,  our theories of truth, the languages we 
use, our modes of communication, and so on. The received version of 
librarianship is inherently problematic because it has clearly opted for 
the physical concept of information-as-data. But librarians are not 
scientists descended from the matter-philosophers through Democritus, 
Bacon, and Einstein. Librarians must grapple with the knowledge 
aspect of human life, not indirectly and instrumentally as scientists who 
use knowledge as their means of understanding physical phenomena, 
but directly and fundamentally as humanists trying to understand ideas 
because they are concerned with knowledge reports about anything that 
interests human beings. Thus, their real concern is human subjectivity; 
and for that, the communication of information-as-ideas is absolutely 
indispensable. We cannot therefore sacrifice the linguistic concept of 
information-as-ideas to the mathematical concept of information-as-
data. Mathematics can communicate man’s physical knowledge of 
empirical realities; but librarians cannot communicate man’s formal 
knowledge of intellectual realities without natural language. Why then 
should library educators so overwhelmingly prefer the mathematical 
communication of physical knowledge to the verbal communication of 
formal knowledge? The exorcising (by virtually unanimous incanta- 
tion) of language studies from library education has encouraged “the 
enthusiastic manipulation of new statistical tools” by librarians, and 
has literally littered the literature of librarianship with the “meaning- 
less use of mathematical symbols ...and homespun ‘applications’ of 
information theory and other scientific subject matter-all intellectu-
ally embarrassing and professionally ~ n i m p o r t a n t . ” ’ ~ ~  The magnifi- 
cent mumbo-jumbo of mathematics, meanwhile, has never helped a 
librarian orient a patron to the landscape of ideas. 
The next question, once we have identified the realities of librar-
ianship, is: What are the best ways of thinking about those realities? 
Again, there are two alternatives that correspond to the two views of 
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what chose realities are. If our ultimate realities reduce to physical data, 
the best ways of thinking about them are empirical. A strong commit- 
ment to experiential learning by observation and experiment must then 
follow, because (as implied by words like emPIRical, exPERiment, and 
exPERience) emPIRicism means that the human mind gets its food for 
thought through the PORes of the human sensory body. It also follows 
that the methodology of librarianship and library education will be 
controlled by the numerate data mongers, mathematical wizards, and 
statistical button counters of physical science. That, as a matter of fact, 
is precisely what has happened. By accepting materialistic ways of 
thinking abour our formal realities we have reified information (by 
reducing ideas to data) in order to study i t  scientifically. This is aclassic 
instance of the hypostatic fallacy: we have transferred ideas, which 
belong to the intelligible world of nonphysical order/structure/form, to 
the material world of physical realities by endowing them with a sub- 
stance (hypostasis) they do not possess. That is why our information 
professionals have reduced the study of information todata science, and 
why we have swallowed the whole scientific package, which includes 
telecommunications engineering (chasing electrical disturbances 
through electronic mazes), general system theory (a formal way of 
thinking for application to empirical studies), cybernetics (controlling 
physical systems by means of physical feedback), and all the rest. Weare 
out of our skulls if we elect to follow this analytical mode of thinking 
any further into its blind alley, because librarianship is formal idea 
science, not physical data science. If our ultimate realities reduce to 
ideas then the best ways of thinking about them are rational, not 
empirical. This implies commitment to the recognitive methods of 
critical humanism, which are essentially introspective and perceptive as 
in the arts, not observational and reflectiveas in science. But the study of 
ideas by the recognitive methods of humanism, in which facts/data/ 
phenomena are used as instruments of communication, has not been 
(and doubtless cannot be) systematized like the methods of science, in 
which facts/data/phenomena are analyzed as objects of study. These 
two functions of data-as objects of study or as instruments of 
communication-must be disentangled because scientific information 
about physical data is wholly instrumental to human 
communication-as are the data themselves. 
Finally, we must ask ethical questions derived from action theory. 
What is the librarian’s job? What is the function we must perform in the 
best of all possible ways in order to qualify as librarians? It is simply 
orientation to information, provided only that information is conceived 
as ideas, not as data. Librarianship is intellectual cartography, the 
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human art of orienting people to ideas-a knowledge service that con- 
stitutes its entire product, the only legitimate contribution it  can make 
to anyone under any circumstances. Action theory is therefore subordi- 
nate to knowledge theory in librarianship, for everything the librarian 
does specifically qua librarian is instrumental to the performance of 
that intellectual function. But another word of caution is necessary, lest 
the professional function of librarians (which is derived from knowl- 
edge theory) be confused with their administrative function (which is 
derived from action theory): the professional function is to orient 
patrons to objective knowledge in the cultural environment, whereas 
the administrative function is to manage the human and nonhuman 
physical resources of specific library operations as a means of perform-
ing the professional function. And that brings up  the sixty-four dollar 
question: What is the best way of performing the librarian’s profes- 
sional function? No one knows the optimal technique for orienting 
patrons to knowledge. But creating that technique isclearly an intellec- 
tual problem in which action is subservient to knowledge. It is not the 
other way around, for this is not a practical problem that can be resolved 
by the anti-intellectual “solutions” of an inordinate library pragma- 
tism. In the end, however, we must come up  with a best way of orienting 
patrons to ideas or forfeit all hope of achievingprofessional status. This 
means negotiating the psychophysical interface between ( 1) the intellec- 
tual structure of knowledge, and (2)the librarian’s technology of access 
to knowledge; and that is an intellectual problem to end all intellectual 
problems. Yet, problems like this “have received almost no attention 
and certainly no intensive exploration’ ’153 from the library profession. 
If we were ever to take this point of view seriously, i t  would 
drastically overhaul our current perceptions of librarianship. “There 
are tides running, and currents moving beneath the surface,” says Shera, 
“that can dramatically reshape the coastline of librarianship so familiar 
to us today.”’” We can ignore these influences “and follow the sabre- 
toothed tiger to extinction”; or we can “see in them the vision of a new 
heaven and a new earth”165 with a virtually unlimited potential for 
enriching our profession. I am irretrievably committed to Shera’s vision 
ofa neolibrarianship. I see i t  as a comprehensive synthesis of knowledge 
in which ideas about anything that is known can be located and corre- 
lated with ideas about anything else that is known. I also see it, not as a 
subculture of information science, but as the larger discipline that 
includes information science among its ancillary subcultures. Informa- 
tion science can help us with our communicative tooling; but that is all 
it can do for us-unless i t  abandons the physical methods of science as a 
means of solving formal problems-because there is a lot more to our 
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profession than building bigger and better bulldozers for pushing char- 
acters around. Science cannot explain intersubjective communication 
because there are no objective explanations of subjectivity; and human 
communication cannot occur until the output of some information-as- 
data system has been transmuted into information-as-ideas by a self- 
conscious mind. Not by a nonconscious brain, mind you, but by a 
self-conscious mind. This has definite implications for library educa- 
tion. Shera saw them, too, for he offered an  interdisciplinary alternative 
to the study of information science at Western Reserve. He was trying to 
build an exhaustive synthesis of knowledge about the intellectual struc- 
ture of the various disciplines in order to familiarize librarians with the 
objects and methods of study in all of the subject matters. He was 
struggling to put the shattered Humpty Dumpty of knowledge together 
again, to rebuild its fragmented analytika into a comprehensive inter- 
disciplinary unity for librarians to study as a whole in relation to its 
parts. He did not exactly succeed in this, but he was at least pointing in 
the right direction. And that prompts the following remarks about the 
rigorous interdisciplinarity of librarianship. 
All professions are interdisciplinary to some degree because they all 
draw freely on their supportive disciplines in the academic colleges: 
medicine, for example, is nourished by physics, chemistry, anatomy, 
biology, zoology, and so forth. But librarianship is totally interdisci- 
plinary. It is not a subject matter: i t  isa way of relating tosubject matter. 
It has a direct relationship to every discipline there is, which means that 
the supportive disciplines of librarianship include everything in the 
liberal arts curriculum as a bare minimum, and much else besides. The 
reluctance of library educators to face the truly overwhelming implica- 
tions of this comprehensive interdisciplinarity is understandable; but 
overwhelming or not, those implications must eventually be faced. 
Library educators should therefore oppose the continuing rejection of 
difficult intellectual problems by the action theorists, who perpetuate 
the supernarrow views of librarianship and research that have plagued 
library education from its inception. Their “manageable realism” 
shows up in many ways, including (1) its deification of descriptive 
studies (which are always dignified as “research”); and (2) its addiction 
to the researcher’s view of critical inquiry (and the nearly total exclusion 
of other viewpoints, such as the observer’s view of research). As to the 
former, the factual account of what is always leads empirical researchers 
to consider the physical aspects of library operations: they are thus 
derailed onto the behavioral function of the librarian (and of the physi- 
cal system he manages qua administrator); they cannot investigate the 
librarian’s professional function as the manager of ideas; their studies 
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have both a pronounced recency-bias and a limited shelf-life (sometimes 
only a few weeks before going out of date); they cannot make normative 
judgments (because good realists do not discuss what ought to be);and 
they cannot produce those larger kinds of scholarly studies which will 
still interest librarians centuries hence. And as to the latter, the library 
schools apparently think they are training researchers who become 
librarians in order to pursue their own research interests. ‘There is 
nothing wrong, of course, with having librarians who can function as 
researchers; but our major involvement with research is maieutic: we are 
intellectual midwives whose job is to assist patrons in giving birth to 
their researches. In order to do that, however, we must concentrate on 
the formal structure and intellectual strategies of research. But the 
library schools, by failing to see that the librarian’s patrons are all 
researchers (varying from superelementary to ultrasophisticated), have 
emphasized the functional substance, content, results, conclusions, 
implications, and other outcomes of research. This fundamental error 
should be corrected forthwith because, as Kaplan reminds us, librarians 
are not researchers: they are the philosophical observers of research who 
must function as research counselors to their patrons. 
The research potential of librarianship, finally, is truly enormous. 
It includes applied research into the immediate problems of library 
practice; but i t  also includes basic research into librarianship as a field 
of study, any of its supportive disciplines, the entire geography of 
knowledge, the role of the sensible symbol in all forms of human 
communication, and the nature of human critical inquiry into any- 
thing. If this research potential could ever be released, i t  would free the 
educators of librarianship from their bondage to its practitioners. In the 
prestigious professions, educational policy is determined by basic 
research, not by practice-and certainly not by “practical” research into 
the mechanics of practice. The function of professional education is to 
reduce the results of basic research to teachable procedures for the 
skillful application of knowledge. Educators cannot do that, however, if 
they are always running to the practitioners and technicians to see what 
should be going on in their classrooms. The application of knowledge 
always presupposes the existence of knowledge to be applied, because 
one cannot apply nothing. But practitioners seldom create the knowl- 
edge they apply: they get i t  from their educators, who got it from the 
researchers who created it. In medicine, for example, most of the basic 
research is done by the Ph.D.s-by scientists, that is to say, who are 
nondoctors in the medical schools or in the supportive disciplines. 
Their research, meanwhile, is continuously evaluated for its medical 
significance by the educators; and the M.D.s must check constantly with 
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their educators to see what should be going on in their practices. That’s 
the way i t  is in professions like medicine, architecture, and engineering. 
It’s not that way, though, in librarianship: it’s the other way around, 
because library education, to say nothing of librarianship itself, has 
never been oriented to basic research. Ad hoc applications abound, of 
course, but they do not qualify as research. Our profession “is a vast 
accumulation of technical details rather than a body of organized 
abstract principles that can be applied in concrete situations.”lffi The 
skillful application of knowledge by librarians is therefore next to 
impossible, as knowledge must exist (because i t  hasalready been created 
by basic research) before it can be applied to anything. 
The educators and practitioners of librarianship have always done 
their housework and done i t  well; but we can never get the what, the 
why, and the how of our act together unless we do our homework. Our 
goal is visible if we have the vision to see it. We do not have to settle for 
managing the physical symbols of knowledge by becoming notation 
mechanics, for we are fully capable of becoming intellectual carto- 
graphers who can create an authentic geography of knowledge and map 
its objective features. In order todo that, however, we will have to follow 
something like Shera’s five-point program in the snippet at the begin- 
ning of this paper: (1) we must “formulate a professional philosophy 
that will meet the rapidly changing needs of society for recorded knowl- 
edge”; (2) “we must re-define our role in society” and “make of the 
library the agency it should be in the total communications process”; 
(3) “we must put our intellectual house in order or we will lose control 
of many functions relating to the communication of the written word 
that are properly our own”; (4) we must recognize that “this need lies at 
the base of every other problem of librarianship”; and there is one final 
necessity, if we intend to do any orall of those things: ( 5 )we must “probe 
deeply, however great the pain.” But the way has been prepared for us: i t  
is currently available in the form-philosophies of critical humanism, 
and we can follow it  if wearenotafraidof difficult intellectual workand 
if we have the will and the stamina to do it. 
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